ADMIRALTY: RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AND
EXONERATION ESTABLISHED BETWEEN COEXTENSIVE
MAINTENANCE AND CURE OBLIGORS
Emphasizing the extent of equity discretion available to admiralty
courts, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that
maintenance and cure expenses resulting from a seaman's "recurring" injury should be borne equally by the obligor liable for the
original injury and the owner in whose employ the injury was
heightened. However, where the injury has resulted .from the
violation of a duty owed the seaman by either obligor, the total
liability is the responsibility of the offending party. Although
determining the extent of contribution in an inequitable albeit
facile manner, the decision bars arbitrary imposition of liability
and significantly indicates judicial disfavor of the traditional
impediments to loss distribution in maritime law.

has long recognized the liability of a shipowner for
medical and living expenses of a seaman who, without wilful misbehavior on his part, becomes ill or is in any way injured in the
service of the ship.1 Since this liability for maintenance and cure
does not automatically terminate when a seaman is employed by a
second shipowner, 2 the obligation may be simultaneously borne by
both employers if the seaman's original injury recurs 3 during the
I The maintenance and cure right "stems from the ancient sea codes of the Middle
ADMIRALTY

Ages which have been aptly termed 'the common law of the sea.'" 1 M. NoRms, TiE
LAw OF SEAMEN § 538 (2d ed. 1962) (author's footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited
as NoRuus]. See, e.g., LAws OF OLERON arts. VI-VII, 30 F. Cas. 1171, 1174-75; LAws OF
WxsBuy arts. XVIII, XIX, & XXXIII, 30 F. Cas. 1189, 1191-92. Recovery encompasses
"wages to the end of the voyage and subsistence, lodging and care to the point where
the maximum cure attainable has been reached." 1 NoRsS § 537. See generally
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 727-36 (1943); Bensing & Friedman, The Law
of Admiralty- A Primer, 11 W. Rrs. L. REv. 21, 43-46 (1959); Bradley, An Introduction to Admiralty and Maritime Law, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 81, 93-94; Levinson, Current
Developments in the Field of Maintenance and Cure, 11 NACCA L.J. 140 (1953);
Comment, Admiralty Right to Maintenance and Cure, 38 ILi.. L. REv. 193 (1943);
Comment, Admiralty-Maintenance and Cure, 50 MicH. L. REv. 435 (1952).
2 E.g., Permanente S.S. Corp. v. Martinez, 369 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1966). See
notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
8
Where an injury "recurs" it cannot be maintained that an actual "cure" had been
effected subsequent to the initial injury. For the "recurrence" to create a coextensive
maintenance and cure obligation, the original injury must be a substantial cause of
the subsequent disability. See Gore v. Clearwater Shipping Corp., 378 F.2d 584 (3d
Cir. 1967). Recovery for recurrence of an injury sustained in a prior employment
is predicated upon the long-recognized principles that a shipowner is responsible for
maintenance and cure to a seaman displaced in the vessel's service, Aguilar v. Standard
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subsequent service. Recently, in Gooden v. Sinclair Refining Company,5 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit established rights
of contribution and exoneration to determine ultimate liabilities
between two shipowners having coextensive obligations. The decision, although generally precluding arbitrary imposition of the
expense, fails to promulgate a scheme of apportionment consistent
with the basic characteristics of the maintenance and cure obligation. Nevertheless, the rationale of the decision may adumbrate
reconsideration of other rules governing joint liabilities in admiralty.
Seaman Gooden suffered a back injury while employed by Texaco. Deemed fit for duty by the Public Health Service after extensive
medical treatment, Gooden subsequently was engaged as a seaman by
Sinclair Refining Company. Because of a recurrence of the original
injury, however, Gooden was shortly thereafter required to leave
Sinclair's employ for further treatment. 6 Although separate libels
for maintenance and cure against Texaco and Sinclair were initially
instituted, the suits were consolidated for trial upon Sinclair's impleader of Texaco. 7 The district court allowed judgment against
only Sinclair for maintenance and cure expenses arising subsequent
to Gooden's service with that employer,8 but further held Sinclair
entitled to reimbursement by Texaco for the cost of the recovery. 9
Reversing on appeal, the circuit court held that Sinclair had a right
Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730-32 (1949), and that a maintenance and cure obligation does
not depend upon any causal connection between the disability and the service, Farrell
v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1949); Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261,
263 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
'Compare Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (recovery
from last vessel where recurring disease has become manifest), with Pyles v. American
Trading and Prod. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 685, 687 (S.D. Tex. 1965), modified on other
grounds, 372 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1967) (recovery from vessel where disability originated
despite subsequent employment as seaman).
5378 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1967), noted in 13 ViL. L. REv. 187 (1967).
67 378 F.2d at 578.
Id.
8 Gooden v. Texaco, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 343, 347-48 (E.D. Pa, 1966). Since a coextensive obligation existed only as to the expenses incurred after Gooden's employment with Sinclair, those expenses produced the principal dispute in the case. See 378
F.2d at 580 n.4. The district court rendered judgment against Sinclair, reasoning that
as a matter of convenience Gooden should be allowed to secure total recovery from
the last vessel on which he served. To avoid duplicity of recovery, however, judgment
was not allowed against Texaco for that period. 255 F. Supp. at 348. The circuit
court, on the other hand, concluded that the seaman should have been awarded judgment in full against both Sinclair and Texaco in order to protect his right to collect
from either owner. 378 F.2d at 579 n.3.
' 255 F. Supp. at 348.
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to complete exoneration only if Texaco's negligenceO or a breach
of its absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship" had led to Gooden's
injury. 12 If neither shipowner had breached a duty, ultimate maintenance and cure liability was to be distributed equally by means
3

of contribution.1

The shipowner's duty to provide maintenance and cure is not
dependent upon his culpability, 14 but arises merely from the fact of
employment. 5 The duty is deemed so important to the shipownerseaman relationship that it survives any attempted contractual negation.16 Since prompt restoration to service of disabled seamen is in
10 Section 33 of the Jones Act provides that "any seaman who shall suffer personal
injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law .... ." 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). Thus, if Texaco's negligence were
the cause of Gooden's original injury, the seaman would have an action for compensatory damages against the company. See generally Bensing & Friedman, supra
note 1, at 48-51; Comment, Seamen's Injuries: The Jones Act, Unseaworthiness, and
Maintenance and Cure-The Siamese Triplets, 51 CAixn. L. REv. 412 (1963). The court
in Gooden reasoned that since primary liability rests on the party liable in compensatory damages, the party merely secondarily liable should be granted exoneration.
See notes 82-84 infra and accompanying text.
11 A shipowner is liable in compensatory damages "for injuries received by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in
order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175
(1903). See generally Bensing &, Friedman, supra note 1, at 46-48; Foley, A Survey of
the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L. REv. 369 (1967); Comment, The
Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Law of Maritime PersonalInjuries, 21 LA. L. REv.
755 (1961); Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness: Developing Restriction of the
Act-Condition Dichotomy, 21 Rrrrm L. Rnv. 322 (1967); Comment, Expanding the
Warranty of Seaworthiness: Social Welfare or Maritime Disaster, 9 Viin. L. REv. 422
(1964); Comment, Risk Distribution and Seaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966).
12 378 F.2d at 581.
113Id. See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text.
"I See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); 1 NoRsS § 537; Bradley, supra
note 1, at 93; Morrison, Maintenance and Cure and Farrellv. United States, 6 MIAss
L.Q. 168, 172-73 (1952); Slaughter, Basic Principles of the Law of Admiralty, 19 ARK.
L. REv. 93, 105 (1965); Stern, Duration of Seamen's Maintenance and Cure Rights, 8
Cizv.-M A. L. R.v. 275, 278 (1959).
";E.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1962), quoting Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932); see 1 Nosuus § 545.
11Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1962), quoting Cortes v. Baltimore
Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932). The following observation has been made
concerning the policy underlying imposition of the maintenance and cure obligation:
"It encourages seamen to engage in perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at
lower wages. It diminishes the temptation to plunderage upon the approach of sickness; and urges the seaman to encounter hazards in the ship's service, from which they
might otherwise be disposed to withdraw." Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483
(No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (Story, J.). The Supreme Court has recently related
this policy to contemporary commercial practice. Vaughan v. Atkinson, supra at
531-33. See also G. GtLMoRE & C. BLAcK, Tim LAW OF ADnm wrTY § 6-6 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as GmuoRE & BLAcK]; Bradley, supra note 1, at 93-94.
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both the national interest and that of individual shipowners, 7 the
seaman's right to recovery continues until no further improvement
in the seaman's condition may be reasonably expected from medical
care.'8 Generally, re-employment on another vessel 0 or issuance of
a fit-for-duty slip by the Public Health Service 20 evidences, but does
not conclusively demonstrate, the fact of maximum medical re2
covery. 1
Maintenance and cure is a right only to the necessary living and
care expenses engendered by the disability22 and does not constitute
an award of compensation for damages suffered. 23 Recovery in an
action for compensatory damages does not, therefore, prohibit a
separate suit based upon the shipowner's non-tort obligation. 24 A
seaman is, however, entitled to only one recovery of his medical and
subsistence expenses.25 Since a judgment for compensatory damages
will very probably encompass losses equally recoverable under maintenance and cure, 26 admiralty has consistently provided that an in17 See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528-29 (1938); Harden v. Gordon,
11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823); GmLmoae & BLACK § 6-6.
18See, e.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 529-32 (1938). The period

of time for maximum medical recovery is generally construed liberally in the seaman's

favor. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531-33 (1962); Stem, supra note 14.
1"1 NoRms § 561; see, e.g., Hanson v. Reiss S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp. 545, 550 (D. Del.
1960); cf. Campbell v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 141 F. Supp. 431, 435 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
20 1 Nomus § 561; see, e.g., Dobbs v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 243 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Koleris v. S.S. Good Hope, 241 F. Supp. 967, 970
(E.D. Va. 1965).
21 E.g., Permanente S.S. Corp. v. Martinez, 369 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1966); Diniero
v. United States Lines Co., 185 F. Supp. 818, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), af'd, 288 F.2d 595
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961).
22 See McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 911 (1950).
2 See, e.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938). The seaman
may also maintain at his election an action to recover compensatory damages for his
employer's negligence under § 33 of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), or on a
theory of unseaworthiness, see notes 10-11 supra. See generally Comment, Seamen's
Injuries: The Jones Act, Unseaworthiness, and Maintenance and Cure-The Siamese
Triplets,
51 CALiF. L. Rxv. 412 (1963).
20
See, e.g., Permanente S.S. Corp. v. Martinez, 369 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1966);
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 915-16 (2d Cir. 1960). See
generally Comment, Seamen's Injuries: The Jones Act, Unseaworthiness, and Maintenance
and Cure-The Siamese Triplets, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 412 (1963).
2
5E.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1960);
McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 911 (1950). Since maintenance and cure is intended only to provide what the
seaman would receive aboard ship, a seaman is not entitled to "six meals a day."
McCarthy v. American E. Corp., supra.
20 In actions based upon allegations of unseaworthiness or negligence, the elements

Vol. 1968: 383]

ADMIRALTY

jured seaman may not recover from his employer those elements of

maintenance and cure which have been previously recovered from
him or from a third-party tortfeasor in the form of compensatory
damages. 27 It has not been judicially determined, however, whether
a shipowner may obtain relief from some part of his obligation by virtue of compensatory damages paid the seaman during a prior employ.
Although the liability of a maintenance and cure obligor may be
mitigated by the rule against double recovery when the seaman first
recovers from a third-party tortfeasor, 28 this limitation may not obtain
where the seaman chooses initially to exercise his non-tort right. Consequently, a divergence of opinion has arisen with regard to the right
of the maintenance and cure payor to indemnity from the tortfeasor
whose negligence has resulted in injury to a seaman in the payor's
employ. 20 In The FederalNo. 2,30 a right to indemnity was refused
on the ground that the maintenance and cure obligation is contractual in nature and therefore the proximate cause of the shipowner's
damage was the employment relationship, not the tortious act 3 1
of damage recoverable are past and prospective medical expenses, past and prospective
loss of earnings, and an additional sum to compensate for physical injuries and pain
and suffering. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 916 (2d Cir.
1960); 1 NoRmus § 608. Subsistence, lodging, and necessary care and medical expenses
which comprise maintenance and cure are thus likely to be included in the foregoing
elements of compensatory damages. See McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 727,
729 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 911 (1950).
27 See McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 911 (1950); The Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1930); Seely v. New
York, 24 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1928); Thibeault v. Boston Towboat Co., 28 F. Supp. 152,
158 (D. Mass. 1939), aff'd sub nom. Mystic Terminal Co. v. Thibeault, 108 F.2d 813
(lst Cir. 1940).
28 See cases cited note 27 supra.
20 See generally GiLasostE & BLACK §§ 6-14 to -18; Note, Shipowner's Indemnity:
Non-ContractualRecovery of Maintenance and Cure Expenses from Third Party TortFeasor, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 1008 (1967).
0 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927). In this case, a seaman employed on a barge was
injured by a tug's towing hawser which swept across the deck of the barge. The barge
owner, upon paying the seaman's expenses, libeled the tug in rem for reimbursement
of the expenses.
31 Id. at 313-14. The court's rationale and consequent denial of indemnity received
much contemporary criticism. See Note, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1927); 27 CoLum. L.
REv. 212 (1927); 76 U. PA. L. ,xv. 326 (1928); 37 YALE L.J. 533 (1928). The validity
of the result has also been questioned in light of subsequent decisions by the Second
Circuit, e.g., The Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1930), and Seely v. New York, 24
F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1928), which held that the liability of the seaman's employer for
maintenance and cure is secondary to that of one who has neligently injured the
seaman. See Sillanpa v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 1954 A.M.C. 1189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). A
recent commentator has argued that The Federal No. 2 would be decided differently
today in light of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956),
wherein the Supreme Court granted indemnity to a shipowner for losses occasioned by
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Those cases allowing a parent to recover from a third-party tortfeasor for loss of a child's services were distinguished by characterization of the parental obligation as of a higher moral and social order
than the employer-employee contractual relation. 2 Conversely, in
Jones v. Waterman Steamship Corporationsindemnity was granted
to the maintenance and cure payor on the basis that an employer's right to recover for loss resulting from negligent disablement of his employees by a third party was "settled" law in the
United States. 34 Moreover, the court adopted the analogy of the
shipowner-seaman relationship to that of parent and child since seamen, traditionally "wards" of the admiralty, are viewed as "children" by maritime law.3 5 Although the continuing validity of the
third parties performing services for the owner. See Note, Shipowner's Indemnity:
Non-ContractualRecovery of Maintenance and Cure Expenses from Third Party TortFeasor, 18 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1008 (1967). Nevertheless, several courts have followed The
Federal No. 2. See H-10 Water Taxi Co. v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 592 (S.D. Cal.
1966), af'd, 379 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1967); Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 127
F. Supp. 435, 437-38 (D. Mass. 1954); Invin v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 912
(E.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 236 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1956); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v.
Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271, 277-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
3221 F.2d at 314. The court observed that a father's recovery for injury of his
child is based upon the natural parental obligation, the implications of which the tortfeasor is expected to comprehend. However, since the shipowner-seaman obligation is contractual rather than social, the tortfeasor is not presumed to be aware of the
consequences of that relationship. Thus, the analogy fails. Id. But see Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 1946). See also notes 34-35 infra and
accompanying text.
35155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946). In Jones a seaman left his ship at night and
fell into an open ditch beside a railroad track. The seaman settled his claim against
Reading for $750 and executed a general release. He also brought a civil action
against his employer for maintenance and cure. The employer impleaded Reading as
a third-party defendant. The release was held not to bar either the seaman's action
against his employer or the employer's claim against Reading. Id. at 996. Several
other courts have indicated subsequently that indemnity is available to a maintenance
and cure obligor. See Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146, 151
(5th Cir. 1962); Valentine v. Wiggins, 242 F. Supp. 870, 872 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Pure
Oil Co. v. Geotechnical Corp., 129 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (E.D. La. 1955); Pabellon V.
Grace Line, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Sillanapa v. Cornell Steamboat Co.,
1954 A.M.C. 1189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
"1155 F.2d at 998 & n.6. The court of appeals observed that an employer's right
at common law to compensatory damages for injury of his servant by the tortious act
of another extended only to compensation for loss of service, but reasoned that
since the shipowner cannot escape the duty to provide the seaman's maintenance and
cure any more than it could escape the loss of services, recovery for the maintenance
and cure expense should also be allowed. Id. at 1000.
"Id. at 1000-01. The court reached an opposite conclusion to that of the second
circuit in The Federal No. 2 concerning the analogy of the shipowner and seaman
to the parent and child. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. Observing that
the obligations of the ship to its seamen do not rest solely in contract but are imposed
by the courts as a matter of public policy, id. at 1000; see Norris, The Seaman As
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Jones rationale is uncertain,

its result

7

36

889

commentators have generally favored

since indemnification of the shipowner does not increase

the tortfeasor's original liability38 and eviscerates the power of the

seaman to arbitrarily determine ultimate liabilities. 9
Unlike indemnity, which leads to complete remuneration, contribution is a right to reimbursement of only a ratable proportion of
the seaman's total recovery. 40 Although not previously utilized to
distribute maintenance and cure obligations, contribution has been

consistently granted in admiralty to apportion certain losses arising
41
from causes other than fault by means of the "general average."
If a voluntary jettison of a part of the vessel or of its cargo promotes

the safety of either in the face of an imminent peril, the owners of
both the cargo and the vessel must contribute in proportion to the

value of their participating interests. 42 Decrees for this contribution in general average rest exclusively on the "equitable" principle
that those confronted with a common risk should bear the costs of
that risk in some manner reasonably related to the benefits each will
43
derive from the commercial venture.

Contribution has also been traditionally recognized as a means
Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 479 (1954), the court preferred "to impose a higher degree of dignity upon the ship-seaman relationship, awarding to it a
status or a 'social condition' in excess of that given under the ruling in The Federal
No. 2." 155 F.2d at 1001.
"I In Jones the third circuit cited United States v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F. Supp.
807 (S.D. Cal. 1945), which held that the United States was entitled to indemnity
from a third-party tortfeasor for hospital expenses paid as a result of the injury of
a soldier. Subsequent to the Jones decision, however, the Supreme Court affirmed
a circuit court reversal of Standard Oil. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947), aff'g 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946), rev'g 60 F. Supp. 807 (SM. Cal. 1945).
Whether this actually debilitated the result in Jonesis disputed. Compare Gomes v.
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 127 F. Supp. 435, 437-38 (D. Mass. 1954) (following
the Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra), with Pure Oil Co. v.
Geotechnical Corp., 129 F. Supp. 194, 198 (E.D. La. 1955) (following Jones).
'I See 1 P. EDELMAN, MAMITINE INJURY AND DEATa 56-58 (1960); GILMORE & BLACK

§ 6-18.
88

GIoRE & BLACK § 6-18.
I' See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
10 E.g., Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964); Putvin
v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
"1See, e.g., Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 535 (1956); Barnard v. Adams, 51
U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303 (1850). See generally GrrMORE & BLACK §§5-1 to -15; R.
LOWNDFS & G. RUDOLF, LAW OF GENERAL AVERAGE AND THE YoRK-ANTwmsP RumES (8th
ed. 1955); Bensing g- Friedman, supra note 1, at 38-41; Felde, General Average and the
York-Antwerp Rules, 27 TUL. L. REv. 406 (1953).
,1 See GiLmoRE & BLACK § 5-1, at 222; Bensing & Friedman, supra note 1, at 39;
Felde, supra note 41, at 407.
"1See Ray, Uniformity As a Common Goal, 10 J. PuB. 1. 276, 279 (1961).
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of apportioning damages among joint tortfeasors in admiralty.44
Rather than merely an equitable adjustment, however, such apportionment is a substantive right arising directly from the tort. 45
Originally propounded to assure equal distribution of loss when two
vessels were at fault in a collision, 46 this form of contribution was
gradually extended to non-collision situations involving joint tortfeasors.47 This expanded utilization was terminated, however, by
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corporation4 in
which the Supreme Court declared that contribution among joint
tortfeasors could be invoked only to distribute collision losses. 49 Spe"See generally Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and
Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 304 (1957).
" See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1907); Stradley
v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 543 (1951), quoting Drummond v. United States, 78
F. Supp. 730, 731 (E.D. Va. 1948) (dictum). Thus, the party sued for contribution
in admiralty may not rely on personal defenses available against the injured party.
See, e.g., The Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942). But see United States v.
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 294 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1961), revd on other grounds, 372 U.S.
597 (1963). Neither may he rely upon a statute of limitations which would have barred
the original libel. See, e.g., The Conemaugh, 135 F. 240 (N.D. IlL. 1904).
,' See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284
(1952); Ray, supra note 43, at 285. In adopting the moiety rule for collision cases in
the United States, the Supreme Court observed that "[u]nder the circumstances usually
attending these disasters, we think the rule dividing the loss the most just and equitable,
and as best tending to induce care and vigilance on both sides, in the navigation." The
Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78 (1854). There has
been considerable pressure recently for the apportionment of damages in collision
cases on the basis of degree of fault, see McKeel v. Schroeder, 215 F. Supp. 756, 759-60
(N.D. Cal. 1963); N.M. Paterson & Sons v. Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1962),
rev'd, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963); GILMoRE & BLAcK § 7-20; Ray, supra note 43, at
286-88, since it is the prevailing rule in other nations, see Staring, supra note 44, at
338-44.
" In The Ira M. Hedges, 218 U.S. 264 (1910), the Supreme Court indicated that
contribution was an integral part of admiralty and drew no distinction between different types of torts. Id. at 270. Subsequently, many lower court decisions specifically
recognized the right in non-collision cases. See, e.g., Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co.,
151 F.2d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1945); Barber S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Quinn Bros., 94 F. Supp.
212, 213 (D. Mass. 1950); Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 681
(E.D. Pa. 1947); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574, 588-89 (N.D. Cal. 1947). But see
notes 48-49 infra and accompanying text.
'- 342 U.S. 282 (1952). In this case a shipowner hired a land-based contractor to
make repairs on the vessel. An employee of the contractor was injured aboard ship
and brought suit against the owner alleging negligence and unseaworthiness of the
vessel. The owner brought in the contractor as a third-party defendant and the jury
returned a special verdict finding the contractor 75% and the owner 25% responsible.
Id. at 283.
"9Id. at 284-85. The Court recognized the ancient origin of the collision moiety
rule but observed that "this Court has never expressly applied it to non-collision
cases." Id. at 284. Admitting the controversial nature of the rule, the Court nevertheless concluded that "it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules

Vol. 1968: 383]

ADMIRALTY

cifically finding that a shipowner was not entitled to contribution
from a non-shipowner employer of the injured party, the Court concluded that since Congress had enacted pervasive legislation governing maritime personal injury50 without granting such recovery, imposition of contribution in non-collision cases should await legislative
approval.5 ' Though Halcyon may be distinguishable from previous
decisions permitting apportionment since the non-contributing employer was not a tortfeasor under the applicable statute, 52 the broad
proscription of the decree has received general judicial acceptance. 53
of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional

action." Id. at 285.

"At the time of the Halcyon decision, Congress had enacted the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, §§ 1-50, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (now 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964)); the Limited Liability Act of 1871, ch. 100, §§ 1-59, 16 Stat.
440; the Harter Act, ch. 105, §§ 1-6, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (now 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96

(1964)); the Jones Act, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (now 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964));
and the Public Vessels Act, ch. 428, §§ 1-10, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (now 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90

(1964)). See 342 U.S. at 285-86.
c 342 U.S. at 285-87. In the opinion of the Court, Congress was best adapted to
consider the varying interests of the shipowners, seamen, stevedores, longshoremen, and

insurance companies involved, id. at 286, and thus a resolution of these interests by
judicial rule would be unwise. See note 49 supra.
r2 See Staring, supra note 44, at 305 n.9, 345.
" See, e.g., Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 791-93 (3d Cir. 1953);
Horan v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 32, 33 (E.D. Pa. 1952). But see Russell,
Poling & Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 890, 892-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (affirming
right of contribution in stranding cases).
Subsequent to Halcyon, the Supreme Court granted a shipowner the right to
indemnity from a land-based contractor whose acts were the sole affirmative cause of
the shipowner's liability to the contractor's employee. See Italia Societa per Azioni di
Navagazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964) (implied indemnity available where injury caused by stevedore's unseaworthy equipment); Waterman S.S. Corp.
v. Dugan &,McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960) (implied indemnity available where
there is no actual contract); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423
(1959) (same); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacierma Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958)
(implied indemnity under the contract between stevedore and shipowner); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (same). Thus, "in the framework of harbor-worker litigation, there are simply no cases left for the Halcyon
rule to apply unless it be imagined that the harbor-worker's employer was a trespasser on the ship." Gi~moRE 8 BLAcK § 6-57, at 371. Furthermore, the author of the
Halcyon opinion, Mr. Justice Black, has noted that in Halcyon the Court "held
that the system of compensation which Congress established in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act [33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1964)] as the
sole liability of a stevedoring company to its employees prevented a shipowner from
shifting all or part of his liability to the injured longshoreman onto the stevedoring
company, the longshoreman's employer." Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., supra at 325 (dissenting opinion). Whether that was the
primary basis of the Halcyon decision, however, was not specifically indicated by the
majority opinion. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand,
if Mr. Justice Black was correct, then implied indemnity has undermined that basis
by depriving the employer of his protection of limited liability.
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In Gooden, the circuit court refused to find the Halcyon limitations applicable to contribution for maintenance and cure since
the infringement of legislative policy and extension of shipowner's
liability found debilitating to a contribution rule in the joint tortfeasor situation" were not relevant in the maintenance and cure
co-obligor context.55 Moreover, the court rejected the contention
that ultimate liability should rest with the shipowner under whose
employ the disability originated, reasoning that where neither employer has violated a legal duty neither should bear a greater part
of the legal obligation.5 6 Rather, emphasizing the power of admiralty
courts to fashion rules for which there is no precise precedent, 57 the
court relied upon equitable principles"' to provide that ultimate lia"See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 28586 (1952); note 55 infra. The court in Gooden assumed from Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinions subsequent to Halcyon, see note 53 supra, that the Halcyon decision
"was designed to preserve an employee's rights in full while at the same time limiting
an employer's liability to that provided by Congress." 378 F.2d at 583, citing Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 135 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting).
" The Gooden court concluded that the considerations militating against the
adoption of a contribution rule in Halcyon, see notes 50.51 supra and accompanying
text, were not controlling since reimbursement rights do not increase existing liabilities
of shipowners to seamen, restrict a seaman's ability to recover, or impinge upon other
expressed legislative policies. 378 F.2d at 583.
50 378 F.2d at 580: "If the accident occurred even though Texaco exercised due
care, maintained a seaworthy ship, and violated no other duty owed the seaman, its
obligation toward the seaman during this period stands on precisely the same footing
as Sinclair's: a disability arising while the seaman was in the service of the ship.
Therefore, apart from a showing that Texaco violated a duty owed the seaman
which caused his disability, we conclude that Sinclair and Texaco should share equally
their coextensive obligation to provide maintenance and cure."
57Id. at 583. The court justified the creation of reimbursement rights as a "'per.
formance of the Court's function in declaring the general maritime law, free from inappropriate common-law concepts." Id., quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale,
358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959).
1; The circuit court supported its use of equitable principles by reliance upon the
proposition that "'[e]quity is no stranger in admiralty; admiralty courts are, indeed,
authorized to grant equitable relief."' 378 F.2d at 582, quoting Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962). The application of equitable principles in admiralty courts
has been given judicial recognition. See, e.g., United States v. Cornell S.S. Co., 202
U.S. 184, 194 (1906); Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A.J. Perez
Export Co., 303 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962); United
Transp. & Lighterage Co. v. New York & Baltimore Transp. Line, 180 F. 902, 905
(S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff'd, 185 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1911); Eagle, Star & British Dominions v.
Tadlock, 14 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Cal. 1936). For example, the physical hazards
of a maritime venture give play to "equitable" principles, such as contribution on the
general average, which are designed to afford protection for all interests subjected to
these risks. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, considerations
of maritime hazard and "equity" led to the adoption of the moiety doctrine in collision cases. See note 46 supra. Moreover, in order to avoid common-law technicalities, equitable principles such as estoppel, laches, subrogation, and the rule per-
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bility must rest equally upon parties with coextensive maintenance
and cure obligations in the absence of a violation of any duty to the
seaman by either obligor. 50
Although admiralty courts are not generally empowered to grant
affirmative equitable relief, 60 they may incorporate appropriate equitable principles to resolve competing maritime policies. 1 Moreover,
reimbursement rights similar to those granted in Gooden are not
unique in admiralty.62 Thus, the basic equitable rationale of the
mitting an agent to sue in his own name have become deeply rooted in the maritime
law. See Flores v. The SS George Lykes, 181 F. Supp. 53 (D.P.R. 1960) (estoppel);
New York Trap Rock Corp., 172 F. Supp. 638, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (subrogation);
The Speybank, 28 F.2d 436, 437 (D. Md. 1928) (agent can sue in his own name);
Comment, Admiralty: The Doctrine of Laches, 37 TUL. L. REv. 811 (1963).
On the other hand, admiralty will not grant equitable relief merely because the
transaction in question is of a maritime nature. E.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Del Caribe, 839 U.S. 684, 690 (1950). See generally 1 E. BENEDIar, THE LAw
OF AmERICA AmALTrY §71 (6th ed. A. Knauth 1940, Supp. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as BFN.Dicr]; 29 TEXAS L. Rav. 244 (1950). For example, admiralty will not
take jurisdiction of an action to set aside a sale of ships where the sale has been
induced by fraudulent representations. E.g., The Captain Johnson, 64 F. Supp. 559
(D.N.J. 1946); The Managua, 42 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Neither will admiralty take jurisdiction to grant recovery of money paid because of false and
fraudulent representations. Kaufman v. John Block & Co., 60 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y.
1945). Equitable relief, however, has been granted where the equitable claim is presented defensively. See, e.g., Deitcher Bros. v. Skibs, 1942 A.M.C. 1466 (S.D.N.Y.). Moreover, equitable relief has been granted in an affirmative manner when subsidiary to,
and necessary for, the effective preservation of a cause wholly maritime. For example,
where a shipowner unjustifiably withholds maintenance and cure to the detriment
of a seaman, the seaman is entitled to an equitable award of counsel fees to preserve
the effectiveness of the maintenance and cure judgment, Vaughan v. Atkinson, supra,
and where an admiralty court's power might be thwarted by a fraudulent transfer, a
libel to set aside the transfer is within the purview of admiralty jurisdiction. Swift
& Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, supra.
O878 F.2d at 581. The court stated that "[t]o the extent a shipowner proves that
payments made in satisfaction of a maintenance and cure obligation have reduced or
eliminated a concurrent claim which a seaman but for the prohibition against double
recovery could assert against another party absent a release, the shipowner is entitled to reimbursement from the other party in such amount as will cause the ultimate liability to be placed: (1) by means of contribution, equally upon all shipowners with coextensive maintenance and cure obligations..... Id.
00 See generally 1 BENEDiCr § 71; 29 TExAs L. REv. 244 (1950).
Affirmative equitable relief has been granted, however, for the preservation of an established maritime cause of action. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 869 U.S. 527 (1962); Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950); note 58 supra.
01 See note 58 supra. The equitable principle of contribution has traditionally
been recognized in admiralty collision, see note 46 supra and accompanying text, and
general average cases, see notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text, as have equitable
principles such as estoppel and laches, see Comment, Admiralty: The Doctrine of
Laches, 87 TuL. L. RE . 811 (1963); 29 TExAs L. REv. 244 (1950).
02See notes 41-47 & 61 supra and accompanying text. Indemnity has previously
been implied in favor of a shipowner who became liable solely because of the actions
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decision seems fundamentally consistent with admiralty principles.0 3
Nevertheless, the rules promulgated by the decision raise questions
as to the mechanics of their application.
The immediate consequence of allowing contribution among
coextensive maintenance and cure obligors is to avoid arbitrary imposition of ultimate liability,6 4 for a co-obligor is protected from
having to absorb the full cost of maintenance and cure by virtue of
his comparative availability to suit or the seaman's caprice or collusion
with another interested party. 5 But even the equal-division method
of apportionment as selected in Gooden arguably fails as an optimum
standard since it is unrelated to the fundamental nature of the maintence and cure obligation. The basic purpose of that obligation is to
induce employment in the merchant marine by guaranteeing the sea60
man a certain degree of protection in return for services rendered.
The onerous consequences resulting from the disregard of this prinof a third party. See, e.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423
(1959); Jones v. Waterman S.S. Co., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
GaSee 13 VirL. L. REv. 187, 188 (1967).
64 The court in Gooden emphasized that reimbursement rights remove from the
hands of the original libellant the ability to control ultimate disposition of maintenance
and cure responsibility among co-obligors. 378 F.2d at 580.
65 See also W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAv OF ToRTS § 47, at 275 (3d ed. 1964)

[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. It is arguable that contribution may impede loss distribution where one of the co-obligors is a poor "loss distributor"; ie., a marginal operator
whose elasticity of demand is greater than one, see D. WATSON, PRIcE T EORY AND ITS
USES 30-31 (1963), and who is unable sufficiently to insure his shipping operation. Absent
collusion or unavailability to suit, a seaman will most likely sue the more financially
sound of two obligors. Cf. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic
Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1162-63, 1167 (1941). Without contribution, liability
would necessarily remain with the better loss distributor. On the other hand, the availability of contribution requires one-half of the expense to be borne by the poor loss distributor. The argument that a seaman would prefer to sue the less affluent shipowner
to avoid a high-powered legal defense is not compelling since the liberal judicial
protection of seamen leaves few issues of law open to legal scrutiny. Rather, recovery for maintenance and cure can be had upon the mere factual showing that the
seaman's disability arose without wilful misbehavior on his part. See Norris, supra
note 35.
66 The doctrine of maintenance and cure originated in the ancient codes which
were enforced to achieve employee security and thereby encourage development of
international trade by staffing and sustaining national merchant marines. See Levinson,
Current Developments in the Field of Maintenance and Cure, 11 NACCA L.J. 140, 141
(1953); Comment, Admiralty Right to Maintenance and Cure, 38 ILL. L. REv. 193,
194 (1943). See also 1 NoR=s §§538-39; note 16 supra. This motivation remains
today with only slightly different emphasis: "If men are to go down to the sea in ships
and face the perils of the ocean, those who employ them must be solicitous of their
welfare. Maintenance and cure is an inducement on the part of the masters and
owners [to give seamen] . . . a degree of security, though injury or sickness be incurred." Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 524 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ciple are illustrated by the situation in which 'the seaman is employed
by one shipowner for several years before suffering a disability and,
upon apparent recovery, is subsequently hired by a second shipowner
in whose employ the disability soon recurs. 67 Under Gooden, each
shipowner would be required to contribute equally to expenses incurred after the seaman's employ with the second owner6 8 even
though that employer profited far less from the seaman's services.6 9
Conversely, equal division will impose an even greater burden on
the first shipowner when the second has had the benefit of the seaman's services for a relatively longer period since the first employer
will more likely pay the greater proportionate part of the total maintenance and cure expense.7 0 As between shipowners with coextensive
duties, however, apportionment of liability according to services
rendered would appear most consistent with the nature of the underlying maintenance and cure obligation. Moreover, services-rendered

apportionment, a variation of the resolution previously employed
successfully in calculating contribution in the general average,71 involves no operative difficulties.

The determination of shares would

most equitably be made upon the basis of the total medical and living
expense rather than only upon that incurred subsequent to the

second employ. 72 Thus, the second shipowner would be liable for
07The

phrase "recurs" is used to denote the situation where an original injury

elsewhere was the substantial factor in causing the subsequent disability, as happened
in Gooden to create a coextensive maintenance and cure liability. See 378 F.2d at 580;
note 3 supra.

08 378 F.2d at 581. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
00In Gooden the seaman was in Texaco's employ approximately sixty days, 255 F.
Supp. at 344, but in Sinclair's employ only ten, id. at 345. Texaco, therefore, theoretically derived six times the benefit from Gooden's services realized by Sinclair.
70 For example, assume the seaman was in the first shipowner's employ for just
two days before the original injury occurred, and was disabled for two years. Prior
to actual recovery, he might work two months for the second owner before his injury
recurs. Subsequently, he is disabled another year until he achieves maximum medical
recovery. Under Gooden the first vessel owner must pay 21/2 years maintenance and
cure expense while the second pays for only / year.
71 See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
72 The Gooden court considered solely the maintenance and cure expense incurred
subsequent to recurrence of the disability since this was the only period of coextensive obligations. 378 F.2d at 580 n.4. If apportionment is to be made according
to relative benefit derived from the seaman's services, however, total maintenance
and cure expense must be considered, since the first shipowner may pay a considerable
portion of the expense before the obligation becomes coextensive. See note 70 supra
and accompanying text. Note that because the second shipowner's obligation begins
with recurrence of the injury, he can never be obligated for an amount in excess of
the expense incurred after recurrence,
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the amount of total maintenance and cure costs equal to his fraction
of the employment span over both employers, not to exceed the costs
incurred subsequent to the attachment of his obligation.73 In this
manner, each employer's cost would be directly related to the benefit
received from the employment of the injured seaman. Appraised
on the basis of ease of judicial administration," this system would
delay computation of obligations little more than equal division since
determination of length of service and recourse to a simple mathematical formula75 would provide the dollar amount of an award.
Regardless of the precise manner in which the maintenance and
cure expense is allocated, the very fact of distribution may denote a
gravitation from the Halcyon proscription of contribution among
joint tortfeasors in non-collision cases. The Gooden emphasis upon
equal distribution of a common burden" and the necessity of pre73 If Gooden were employed by Texaco for five weeks prior to his original injury,
and by Sinclair for one week before recurrence of the injury, maintenance and cure
expense would be apportioned in a ratio of five to one. Below is a simple mathematical formula for determining apportionment:
X= period of seaman's employment with shipowner #1
Y= period of seaman's employment with shipowner #2
T = total amount of maintenance and cure expense to be apportioned
S =one share of this expense
1
S
x+Y =
T
T

Shipowner #1's liability = X-S
Shipowner #2's liability = Y.S
Since the second shipowner could never be held liable for a seaman's maintenance
and cure expense accumulated before the seaman's employment with him, see note 72
supra, one exception to the above general apportionment would have to be made.
Assuming that X and Y are in a five to one ratio and the maintenance and cure expense totaled $11,000, $10,000 of which was accumulated after the seaman's employment with the first shipowner but before his employment with the second, the second

shipowner would be liable for only $1000. Admittedly, apportionment of expense in
the case of this exception would not be strictly related to the period-of-employment
basis, but the apportionment would still be closer to the relative benefits derived than
apportionment under the Gooden rule. Under Gooden the respective obligation
would be $10,500 and $500 instead of $10,000 and $1000.
71The promotion of unnecessarily complex litigation among shipowners which
frustrates an indigent seaman's collection of maintenance and cure would in principle

violate the traditional admiralty policy favoring the timely protection of seamen's
rights. See generally Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 289, 246-48 (1942);
Norris, supra note 35. But see Note, Wards of the Admiralty-An Anachronism?, 16
GEo. WAsir. L. Rxv. 523 (1948).
" See note 73 supra.
76 378 F.2d at 580. See note 56 supra.
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cluding arbitrary imposition of liability77 may induce a future
tempering of the Halcyon dictate78 Although the precise holding
of Halcyon is not traversed by Gooden,7 9 the latter is incompatible

with the Supreme Court's rationale, for the new precedent makes no
attempt to disparage the deference to legislative evaluation demanded
by Halcyon.80 To the contrary, the implied dissatisfaction with congressional tolerance of archaic admirality traditions parallels the
equitable tenor of criticisms which preceded the acceptance of contribution among joint tortfeasors at common law.81 Thus, if the
Gooden court is representative of a broader based recognition of the
need for more equitable liability distribution, the demise of other
restrictive rules of contribution in admiralty may be forecasted.
Having determined that equity required joint satisfaction of the
coextensive maintenance and cure obligation when neither party was
at fault, the Gooden court further concluded upon the same basis
that where one of the vessel owners had violated a duty owed the
seaman, the entire expense should be borne by that employer.8 2
The circuit court emphasized that primary liability resides with the
tortfeasor when his breach of duty is judicially determined concurrently with that of the maintenance and cure obligor.8 3 Reasoning
that primary liability should not vary merely because the seaman has
proceeded initially upon his non-tort claim, the court deduced that
7 See 378 F.2d at 580; note 64 supra.
71Since Halcyon is distinguishable on its facts from previous cases allowing in-

demnity among joint tortfeasors in non-collision cases, see note 52 supra and accompanying text, a court might consider the broad no-contribution dictate as mere dictum, limit the case to its facts, and allow contribution. See Staring, supra note 44,

at 305 n.9, 345.
70 In its promulgation of the no-contribution principle, the Halcyon Court was

concerned exclusively with the reimbursement right of parties whose duty to pay
arose upon their negligent act. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284-85 (1952); notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text.
so See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
" According to one authority, "half a century of vigorous attack upon the original
rule [denying contribution] has had its effect in the passage of statutes in some
twenty-three states, which to a greater or less extent permit contribution among tortfeasors." PRossaE §47, at 275. See generally Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 365; 32 CoLum. L. REv. 94 (1932); 45
HARv. L. REv. 349 (1931).
82 378 F.2d at 581: "[U]ltimate liability [Will] be placed . . . by means of exoneration, fully upon the party with a primary obligation in damages arising out of negligence, unseaworthiness, or other violation of duty."
11Id. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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the shipowner required to satisfy such a claim was entitled to
s4
exoneration from the tortfeasor
The concept of exoneration promulgated in Gooden differs substantially from previously utilized indemnity principles. Though
indemnity generally has arisen in favor of a maintenance and cure
payor only if there is a contract between the tortfeasor and the
payor from which a duty of due care can be implied,85 reimbursement under the Jones rationale is based upon the tortfeasor's duty
to reimburse the employer for services of an employee lost by virtue
of the tort.86 Neither of these principles were applicable in Gooden
since at the time of the original injury no relationship existed between the second owner and either the seaman or the alleged tortfeasor.8 7 The concept of exoneration utilized by the circuit court
must not, therefore, arise from a duty of due care toward the indemnitee. Rather, the rationale appears to be founded exclusively
on the equitable principle that primary liability for maintenance
and cure expense should reside with the wrongdoer since he will pay
only that which could be recovered from him by the seaman in an
action for compensatory damages.88
Although Gooden was concerned solely with reimbursement
81 See note 82 supra.
'I See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Macirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); H-10
Water Taxi Co. v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 592 (SD. Cal. 1966). But see Crumady
v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959) (implied indemnity available
where there is no actual contract). In Crumady, however, the indemnitor was
performing services aboard the indemnitee's vessel, thus perhaps giving rise to the
requisite relationship.
"Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992, 998 (3d Cir. 1946). See note 34
supra and accompanying text.
8 See 378 F.2d at 578. At the time of the original injury, the seaman was neither
in the second shipowner's employ nor was there a contractual or service relationship
of any kind between the two owners on which a duty of due care as to the health of
the seaman could be predicated. Id.
8"There is a significant body of authority in admiralty and related areas granting
non-contractual indemnity on the basis of unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Simpson
Timber Co. v. Parks, 1966 A.M.C. 1081 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd upon rehearing on other
grounds, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 388 U.S. 459 (1967). See
generally Note, Shipowner's Indemnity: Non-Contractual Recovery of Maintenance
and Cure Expenses From Third Party Tort-Feasor, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 1008 (1967). Nevertheless, prior to Gooden no court had allowed recovery to an indemnitee who was
commercially unrelated to the indemnitor or the original libellant at the time of the
tortious act. Nonetheless, the Gooden view of exoneration can be justified on the
traditional theory that the wrongdoer would be unjustly enriched if the faultless payor
were made to compensate for any portion of a loss caused by the former. Cf, e.g.,
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Simpson Timber Co. v.
Parks, supra.
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rights among shipowners, the theory of exoneration may have a
broader application. In particular, the court spoke in general terms
of a shipowner's right to exoneration from "another party"' 9 rather
than merely from "another vessel owner." Moreover, the policy of
uniform ultimate liability emphasized in Gooden 0 is apparently relevant irrespective of the commercial status of the party liable in damages. Therefore, a non-negligent payor's right to reimbursement may
comprehend the situation where the seaman's injury, stemming
originally from the tortious act of one other than a vessel owner,
was "heightened ' 91 in the payor's service. Allowing a payor this
recovery may be justified since the ultimate obligor is paying no
more than that which could arguably have been recovered from
him.02 Yet, where the non-shipowning tortfeasor is a natural individual, his opportunities to distribute loss may be significantly less
than those of a shipowner. Thus, loss distribution analysis may
suggest that exoneration should be restricted solely to actions among
shipowners9 3 No language in the Gooden opinion, however, necessitates limitations on the applicability of the reimbursement rule.
Although the Gooden court articulated procedural rules to meet
the objection that its opinion would result in an increase in litigation which might delay a seaman's recovery, 94 potential detriment of
this sort could be attenuated by encouraging extra-judicial settlement. While a potentially liable party would normally have little
reason to seek a release when the extent of his obligation might be
expanded by a subsequent reimbursement award to a co-obligor,
settlement might be promoted if a release secured therefrom were
so 378 F.2d at 581. "To the extent a shipowner proves that payments made in
satisfaction of a maintenance and cure obligation have reduced or eliminated a concurrent claim which a seaman but for the prohibition against double recovery could
assert against another party absent a release, the shipowner is entitled to reimbursement . . . by means of exoneration .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
00 1d.: "Given this fact that a seaman who joins two defendants in one suit is required to execute primarily on his damages judgment and only secondarily on his
maintenance and cure judgment, the ultimate result should not be different here
because the seaman has proceeded first upon his maintenance and cure claim."
01 See note 3 supra.

02See GiuYoRE & BLACK § 6-18, at 276.

0"See note 65 supra, suggesting that loss distribution problems will arise even
where the maintenance and cure obligation is apportioned among shipowners.
" The circuit court stressed that the seaman's recovery was not to be restricted
to the party ultimately liable, 378 F.2d at 579 n.3, and instructed a trial court which
had all parties before it to determine the seaman's rights before proceeding to issues

of reimbursement, id. at 582 n.5.
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given the effect of relieving the settling obligor's reimbursement
duty. Whether a release was envisoned by the Gooden court as
having that effect is unclear,9 5 although the opinion does indicate
that a release of one co-obligor would not exonerate all.10 Even
absent a definitive specification, placing the power to limit a party's
obligation in the hands of the libellant is inconsistent with Gooden's
primary objective of precluding arbitrary imposition of liability, 7

since opportunities for collusion and discrimination remain.
In disregarding superfluous technicalities, Gooden convincingly
alters and expands reimbursement rights among simultaneous main-

tenance and cure obligors. Perhaps more importantly, the emphasis
placed by the court upon achieving an equitable imposition of ultimate responsibility between parties possessing joint liabilities may

presage a trend away from the impediments to contribution in
analogous areas of maritime law. While future precedents can reevaluate the potential inequities of the equal-division method of
contribution, attempts should be undertaken to preserve the divergence made by Gooden from outdated admiralty procedures.
05 The relevant portion of the Gooden rule concerning releases is as follows: "To
the extent a shipowner proves that payments made in satisfaction of a maintenance
and cure obligation have reduced or eliminated a concurrent claim which a seaman
. . . could assert . . . absent a release, the shipowner is entitled to reimbursement .... ." 378 F.2d at 581 (emphasis added). This language may be given contrasting interpretations as to the effect of a release on reimbursement rights: (1) the
broad interpretation would give the shipowner a reimbursement right unless a release
of the prior obligor occurred before the second shipowner's liability arose and thus
before there were concurrent claims, see 13 VILL. L. Rxv. 187 (1967); (2) the limited
interpretation would give the shipowner no reimbursement right if there were a release
of the concurrent claim at any time before the seaman asserted his claim against the
shipowner.
9 378 F.2d at 580 n.4. If the seaman releases the first co-obligor for a small consideration, the second remains liable for the balance of the maintenance and cure
expense.
97 See id. at 580-81; note 63 supra and accompanying text. But see 13 Viu.. L. Ruv.

187, 192 (1967).

